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ABSTRACT: Mexican gray wolves were reintroduced into New Mexico and Arizona in 1998. When wolves kill a producing cow,
ranchers in the region are eligible to receive an indemnity payment equal to the market value of the lost animal. We developed a
model that allows estimation of the present value of the revenue stream that a cow or herd provides and find that if a producing cow
is killed, the decrease in the present value of the rancher’s revenue stream is about $1,230. Mean indemnity payments are currently
$1,000, implying ranchers are not being sufficiently compensated.
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INTRODUCTION
The native range of the Mexican gray wolf (Canis
lupus baileyi) extended from central Mexico north
through Arizona and New Mexico and south of Interstate
40. By the mid-1900s most Mexican gray wolf (hence-
forth “wolf”) populations had been eliminated through
federal, state, and private control campaigns in response
to wolf impacts on the livestock industry.  Following the
passage of the Endangered Species Act in 1973 and the
subsequent inclusion of the wolf as an endangered species
in 1976, recovery efforts to save the species from
extinction in the United States were enacted (USFWS
2007).
For more than 30 years in Arizona and New Mexico,
the threat that wolves posed to cattle (Bos primigenius)
was nonexistent.  This changed in 1998, when the first
group of wolves was reintroduced into the Blue Range
Wolf Reintroduction Area (BRWRA) in eastern Arizona
(Figure 1).  Reintroduction was conducted by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the
Arizona Game and Fish Department under the Mexican
Gray Wolf Recovery Program (USFWS 2007).
Cattle ranches are common within the BRWRA and
surrounding areas, and wolf reintroduction and increasing
wolf populations have led to increased wolf-livestock
interactions.  According to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Wildlife Services (WS) records from 1998-
2006, wolf predation of livestock in the BRWRA
occurred mainly to cattle (cows and calves) and most
often during late spring and summer months. In 1998,
there were only 2 confirmed or probable cattle
depredation incidences by wolves.  This number
increased to 11 in 2002, 38 in 2005, and during the 2-
week period of June 5-18, 2006 there were 9 cattle
depredation incidences (USFWS 2007).
Clearly, the change in government policy from wolf
eradication to reintroduction has had an impact on the
economic returns for ranchers within the reintroduction
area. However, despite the harm to ranchers, the policy
shift may be socially desirable. A common criterion used
to evaluate the social desirability of a change in public
policy is economic efficiency: Pareto efficiency is
defined as an allocation in which it is impossible to make
someone better off without making anyone worse off
(Varian 1992). Thus, a Pareto improvement is a change
in which someone has been made better off without
making anyone else worse off. The policy change in
question could not be considered a Pareto improvement
since ranchers were arguably made worse off.
However, another economic efficiency known as
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency defines efficiency differently.
The Kaldor-Hicks concept defines an outcome as more
efficient if it is possible to create a Pareto improvement
through those made better off compensating those made
worse off (Varian 1992). Thus, an outcome is deemed
efficient if the winners could make a payment to the
losers such that no one is worse off. However, it should
be emphasized that if a policy is judged efficient
according to this definition, it does not require that a
compensating payment actually be made; it only requires
that it could be made. Therefore, a policy is judged
efficient if the benefits outweigh the costs, regardless of
who those benefits and costs fall on.
It is unknown if the shift in policy from wolf
eradication to reintroduction is efficient according to the
Kaldor-Hicks definition. If the benefits to those who
support reintroduction exceed the costs incurred by
ranchers, then it is. In this study, no attempt is made to
judge the efficiency of the policy shift. Rather, the focus
is on estimating the minimum size of the payment that
would have to be made to ranchers such that they are not
worse off. While Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not
require the compensating payment be made, political
acceptability and societal notions of fairness may. A
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Figure 1.  Map of Mexican gray wolf recovery area, including the Blue Range Wolf Reintroduction Area (BRWRA).
(USFWS 2012)
sufficient compensating payment may also be necessary
for the cooperation of ranchers. Therefore, estimation of
the necessary size of this payment is important.
Indemnification programs are a common way to
compensate ranchers for livestock losses. Indemnity may
be paid to ranchers for an unanticipated livestock death,
shifting the cost away from the individual rancher to the
government or private individuals and organizations.
Generally, indemnity programs’ goals are focused for the
benefit of endangered species’ survival, preservation of
habitat or range of wildlife, or to ease recovery efforts of
reintroduced wildlife.  The economic incentive of these
indemnity funds has been vital to the successful reintro-
duction efforts of multiple endangered and reintroduced
species on public and private lands (Defenders of
Wildlife 2006, USFWS 2007).
The Bailey Wildlife Foundation Wolf Compensation
Trust (henceforth “Trust”) is the indemnification program
that reimbursed ranchers for livestock losses due to wolf
predation in the BRWRA (Defenders of Wildlife 2006).
The goal of the Trust was to shift the economic
responsibility for wolf recovery away from the individual
livestock rancher and towards those who want wolf
populations restored in their natural habitat.  The Trust
offered a lump-sum payment to the ranchers whose
animals were depredated by wolves.
Identifying the appropriate amount of indemnity can
be difficult, since the effects of a lost animal can linger
for many years.  The most commonly used benchmark to
assess the value of an animal is the fair market price of
the animal at the time of the animal’s death.  However,
such an approach fails to consider the loss in revenue due
to interrupted production that may occur when an animal
is lost. Therefore, this study will estimate the payment
that would effectively compensate a rancher for the loss
of an animal accounting for any interruptions in
production.
METHODS
Earlier studies have established the dual role of cattle
as both a capital good and a consumption good (Reut-
linger 1966, Jarvis 1974). In particular, the value of a
producing cow is a function of this duality. Producing
cows are considered a capital good because they are used
to produce calves. But at any time, a cow may also be
sold to slaughter as consumption good. Additionally, due
to a limited lifecycle, a producing cow is a depreciating
asset whose value diminishes over time (Mackay et al.
2004). Depreciation can be directly observed in the
diminishing slaughter or salvage value of a cow as she
ages.
Present value (PV) analysis is commonly used by
ranchers to guide management decisions and determine
optimum herd size in relation to different market, feed,
and capital prices. PV analysis estimates the present
value of all future revenue from an asset (the animal or
herd).  For a producing cow, future earnings include the
price its calves can be sold for as well as its own value
when culled. When cattle ranchers use this type of
analysis, it is common to differentiate between calves and
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yearlings, cows, bred heifers, bulls, steers, and cow-calf
pairs (Reutlinger 1966).  The differentiation allows the
producer to distinguish between those individual animals
(cows, bulls, bred heifers) that have the dual nature of
being a capital and consumption good and those (feeder
calves and yearlings, steers) that are exclusively
consumption goods.
The profitability of cow-calf operations depends
greatly on the cow culling and replacement decisions
(Melton 1980, Schmitz 1997).  Herd size is consciously
allowed to grow through the retention of additional
heifers when the expected net present value of retaining
those additional heifers exceeds the amount they could be
sold for. Likewise, herd size is allowed to decrease when
the net present value of retaining heifers is less than the
price those animals could be sold for (Trapp 1986,
Mackay et al. 2004).  However, herd size can be
influenced by events outside the rancher’s control.  Cattle
can unexpectedly die for many reasons including diseases
such as rabies; digestive and respiratory problems;
environmental factors such as drowning and lightning
strikes; and depredation by predators (USDA 2006).
With unanticipated death, the choice between retaining
and culling an animal is taken away from the rancher.
The current indemnity program bases reimbursement
on the current market price of the cow or calf. However,
this amount is insufficient if the animal is a producing
cow. Beyond a certain age, the market price of a cow
will only (or mostly) reflect its use as consumption good,
but its full value to the rancher is also derived from its use
as a capital good. The current reimbursement amount is
also problematic for another reason. When a rancher
loses a producing cow, he/she has the option of
purchasing any variety of replacement cows (open cow,
bred cow, heifer, bred heifer, or cow-calf pair) from a
livestock auction, or they may retain one of their own
calves to replace the lost cow.  There is significant
uncertainty associated with the purchase of a replacement
cow. The rancher cannot be sure of the quality of the
animal, that the cow calves easily or cares for the calf, or
what type of bull sired the calf. Additionally, the animal
will lack knowledge of the area it will be introduced to,
and the rancher may be uncertain where the animal
originated. For these reasons, many ranchers prefer to
raise their own replacement heifers, and the uncertainty of
buying a replacement animal at auction results in a
market price that is below the value of the animal lost to
predation.
To estimate the correct indemnity amount, an
economic model is created that accounts for both the
capital and consumption value of a producing cow.
Additionally, the model reflects the conventional
management practices in the BRWRA region of Arizona
and New Mexico. The model assumes a rancher has a
single producing cow that produces a calf annually
beginning at 2 years of age until the cow is culled in the
fall when 10 years old, after producing a 9th calf.  To
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that all calves are
female. To reflect the preference of many ranchers in the
BRWRA region, the model assumes the 9th calf from the
producing cow will be retained as a replacement heifer.
If the producing cow is killed, the calf born in that year
will be retained as a replacement.
The value of this producing cow can be viewed as the
present value of the revenue stream that it provides. This
revenue stream depends on the particular mix of calves
produced, the price those calves are sold for, and the cull
value of the cow. However, the revenue provided by the
current producing cow may not be the only revenue of
interest. The retained heifer that replaces it also provides
revenue. To the rancher, the relevant stream of revenue is
the revenue he/she earns over all the years in which they
are in business. This may only include revenue from the
current producing cow, but it also includes revenue from
the offspring of that cow.
If the original producing cow is killed, the impact on
the rancher’s revenue is not limited to the lifetime of that
cow. A calf that would have been sold must be retained
and the production cycle is interrupted and shifted.
Therefore, the loss of a producing cow can have impacts
that last for many years. Estimation of the harm caused
by the loss of the cow must account for how that loss
affects the revenue stream realized by the rancher over all
the years in which he/she is in business. The present
value of the revenue stream realized by the rancher over
15 years when there is no unexpected loss of a producing
cow is given by
(1) = ∑ ( ) + ∑ ( ) + ( )
where F is the price a calf can be sold for, C10 is the cull
value of a cow at 10 years of age, and r is the annual
discount rate. Note that the time frame starts at t = 0
when the producing cow has its first calf at 2 years old.
Revenue from selling a calf is not realized in t = 8 or t =
9. In time period 8, the calf born is retained to replace the
producing cow, which is culled in the same year. In time
period 9, the replacement heifer is not old enough to
calve. Additionally, note that we are assuming no
mortality risk due to non-predation causes.
If the rancher were to quit the business after 15 years,
it may be desirable to include the value of their producing
herd in the 15th year under the assumption it would be
sold. In the model developed here, the herd consists of
only one cow, so Equation 1 can be modified to account
for the sale of the producing cow when production stops,
to obtain
(2) = ∑ ( ) + ∑ ( ) + ( ) + ( ) .
Although the producing cow could be killed at any
age, in this model it is assumed it is killed the summer
after calving once. Therefore, the rancher will keep the
cow’s first calf as a replacement and the rancher loses
revenue because this calf is not sold. Additionally, since
the replacement heifer will not be mature enough to
produce the following season, the rancher will lose a year
of production. Accounting for the loss of the producing
cow, the present value of the revenue stream realized by
the rancher over 15 years becomes
(3) = ∑ ( ) + ∑ ( ) + ( ) .
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Likewise, the revenue stream accounting for the sale of
the herd in year 15 becomes
(4) = ∑ (1+ )9=2 + ∑ (1+ )14=12 + C10(1+r)10 + C4(1+r)14.
The difference in the 15-year revenue streams
(excluding herd sale in year 15) is given by
(5) ∆ = ∑ ( ) − ∑ ( ) − ∑ ( ) +( ) − ( )
Note that if r = 0, ∆PV = −2F. This key result shows
that the decrease in the present value of the revenue
stream is approximately equal to the value of 2 calves. It
is only approximately equal because exact equality
depends on a discount rate of zero. The effects in later
time periods that perfectly offset each other with a zero
discount rate will not perfectly offset each other with a
positive discount rate. A similar result is obtained when
the revenue gained from selling the producing cow in
year 15 is accounted for, although the difference in
present value also reflects the slight difference in the
value of that cow at that time due to age. This additional
difference can be seen in the last 2 terms of Equation 6:
(6) ∆ = ∑ ( ) − ∑ ( ) − ∑ ( )+(1 + ) − (1 + ) + (1 + ) − (1 + ) .
The above discussion is based on the assumption that
the relevant revenue stream is from t = 0 to t = 14. Con-
sideration of different time frames will change Equations
1-6. Therefore, the results section will calculate the
change in present value of the revenue stream over a
number of different time frames.
RESULTS
Price information was obtained from the 2005 New
Mexico Annual Statistical Bulletin as reported by the
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS 2005).
Calves were valued at $720.50, and the price at which a
producing cow can be sold for is assumed to decrease
linearly from 1-10 years of age, starting at $1,199. The
discount rate is assumed to be 3%. Table 1 presents the
key results of the model. The loss in revenue equal to the
value of 2 calves can be seen in the change in annual
revenue in t = 0 and t = 1. Additionally, the changes in
annual revenue that would perfectly offset each other
when r = 0 can be seen in time periods 8-11. The change
in t = 8 is due to the additional revenue from having a calf
to sell when there was not one previously. However, this
gain is partially offset by the fact that the producing cow
is no longer culled in that year. The gain in t = 9 is purely
due to having a calf to sell when the rancher did not
previously have one. The offsetting negative amounts in
t = 10 and t = 11 result from effects exactly opposite of
those just described.
Although the changes in annual revenue after t = 1 are
perfectly offsetting when r = 0, when r > 0 they tend to
reduce the negative impact of the lost cow as the time
frame of analysis is extended.  This results from the fact
that the positive effects always precede the negative
effects.  Thus, the positive effects are discounted less than
the negative effects.  This effect is less obvious when the
revenue provided by the sale of the producing cow when
the rancher stops producing is considered.  Note that
consideration of this impact makes the timeframe of
analysis matter less.  Because the replacement heifer is
younger than the original cow, she and her producing
offspring are worth more when sold in most years.
However, there are periodically years in which she and
her producing offspring would be worth less.  For
example, in t = 9, the original cow, had she not been
killed, would have already been replaced by her last calf
that would be 1 year old at that point.  Yet, the heifer that
replaces her when she is killed in t = 0 is still alive in t =9.
The original replacement heifer is worth considerably less
at 9 years old than a 1-year-old calf.
It is interesting that ΔPVa and ΔPVb converge if the
timeframe is extended far enough.  In relatively shorter
timeframes, the difference between ΔPVa and ΔPVb is
created by the revenue realized when the producing cow
is sold.  However, as that sale of that final producing cow
is pushed farther into the future, the discounted value of
the revenue provided decreases and will eventually
approach zero.  Therefore, the difference between ΔPVa
and ΔPVb is gradually eliminated.
Table 1. Change in the producer’s annual revenue and
change in the present value of their revenue stream when
the herd is not sold (PVa) and sold (PVb), evaluated over
different time periods (t).  For example, if the producer
sells his/her herd after 10 years, the change in the net
present value of revenue over the course of that 10-year
time period would be a decrease of $1,128.40.
t Δ AnnualRevenue ($) Δ PVa ($) Δ PVb ($)
0 -720.5 -720.5 -1,100.0
1 -720.5 -1,423.4 -1,230.3
2 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,235.0
3 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,239.6
4 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,244.0
5 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,248.4
6 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,252.7
7 0.0 -1,423.4 -1,256.9
8 368.5 -1,121.0 -1,297.0
9 720.5 -544.1 -1,178.2
10 -368.5 -831.9 -1,128.4
11 -720.5 -1,381.1 -1,230.1
12 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,233.8
13 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,237.4
14 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,240.9
15 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,244.3
16 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,247.7
17 0.0 -1,381.1 -1,250.9
18 368.5 -1,144.8 -1,282.3
19 720.5 -694.1 -1,189.5
20 -368.5 -919.0 -1,150.6
21 -720.5 -1,348.0 -1,230.1
22 0 -1,348.0 -1,232.9
23 0 -1,348.0 -1,235.8
24 0 -1,348.0 -1,238.5
∞ NA -1,229.8 -1,229.8
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DISCUSSION
Despite the results provided above, it remains unclear
what a sufficient amount of compensation for the loss of a
producing cow would be. The difficulty is that the
change in present value of the revenue stream is
dependent on exactly how long the rancher will be in
business or on the time frame considered. Based on the
annual revenue loss, an argument could be made that a
rancher should be paid an amount equal to the value of 2
calves. Yet, this is almost certainly overstating slightly
the actual loss realized by the rancher. There are 3 rea-
sons that this overstates the actual loss.  First, in the year
in which the cow is lost, the rancher’s revenue is less by
the value of one calf; the loss in revenue equal to the
value of a second calf occurs the following year and
should be discounted. Second, if the rancher is in busi-
ness long enough to realize revenue from the next
generation of producing cows, the loss will be further
reduced due to the aforementioned effects of discounting
the offsetting future changes in revenue. Third, compen-
sation equal to the value of 2 calves overstates the
revenue loss because it fails to consider the revenue
earned by the rancher when the producing cow (or herd)
is sold if production is stopped.
Ruling out the value of 2 calves as the correct revenue
loss on which to base compensation leaves two options.
One is to assume arbitrarily that the rancher will leave the
business at some point; compensation could then be
based on the decrease in the present value of the revenue
stream including the revenue provided by the sale of the
cow when production is stopped. However, the
assumption would be arbitrary and would affect the
results. It is at least clear that if such an assumption is
made, ΔPVb rather than ΔPVa is the relevant measure of
the loss. This is because the rancher would sell any
remaining animal when production is stopped.
The only remaining possibility is to base the loss on
the amount to which both ΔPVa and ΔPVb converge
($-1,230). This has 3 advantages. First, it avoids making
a choice between ΔPVa and ΔPVb. Second, it avoids
making an arbitrary assumption about the correct time-
frame of analysis. Finally, it is approximately equal to
the mean of ΔPVb (the mean for time periods 0 to 24 is $-
1,226). This is a desirable property, since it could be
argued that in the absence of information about how long
the rancher will remain in business, it should be assumed
that production will be stopped in some year with a
probability that is constant across all feasible years. Thus,
the difference in the expected present value of the
revenue stream realized by that rancher would simply be
the mean of ΔPVb across all those years.
The model developed and the results it provides are
limited in their applicability to the valuation of the loss of
a producing cow. Specifically, the model assumed that a
producing cow was killed after having its first calf. If the
producing cow was killed later in life, the results would
be slightly different due to the effects of discounting but
would point toward the same conclusions. An exception
to this occurs if the cow is killed after having her final
(9th) calf. In such a case, the loss to the rancher is simply
the cull value of that cow at that time.
Another exception to the results derived here, and one
that highlights the simplistic construction of the model,
occurs when the replacement heifer is killed before
calving. In reality, a rancher has an entire herd from
which to source replacement heifers. Yet, the model
developed here does not contain a mechanism that
accounts for this, because it only incorporates a single
cow. When the retained heifer is killed, there are 2
possible losses, depending on the age of the heifer when
she is killed. If she is young enough so that calves born
in the same season as she was have not yet been sold,
then the rancher would select a different calf of the same
age as a replacement. No loss of calf production occurs,
but the calf used as a replacement is not sold. Therefore,
the loss in this case is equal to the value of one calf. If the
replacement heifer is old enough such that other calves
born in the same season have already been sold, then the
rancher must retain an additional calf next season. This
replacement will be younger and the rancher will lose a
year of production. In this case, the results provided by
the model applied to the loss of a 2-year-old will be
applicable, although the magnitude of the loss will be
slightly different due to discounting.
Ranchers in the BRWRA were reimbursed 100% of
the depredated animal’s market value if the depredation
was confirmed by WS and 50% of market value for
probable depredations (Defenders of Wildlife 2006).
According to data from the Trust, between June 1999 and
January 2006, there were a total of 72 payments made to
compensate ranchers for the loss or injury of cattle due to
wolves: 53 payments for lost calves, 10 payments for lost
cows, and 9 payments for lost heifers, steers, or “cattle.”
The median indemnity payment for depredated cows was
$1,000 and $500 for depredated calves. Based on these
median indemnity payments, it is clear that ranchers are
undercompensated for their loss. According to the results
here, the payment for the loss of a cow should be $1,230
and payment for the loss of a calf should be $721. While
the current indemnity payments are proximate to the loss,
the proximity is coincidence and the payments are based
on a theoretically incorrect approach. The only case in
which payment based on market value can be justified is
if the loss is a cow about to be culled at the end of its
producing life, or a calf. At any other time, the indemnity
amount should be based on the value that ΔPVa and
ΔPVb converge to, which is driven by the value of 2
calves. However, even this amount may be insufficient
despite effectively estimating the revenue loss
experienced by the rancher.
There are several factors that the model and the results
it provides do not capture. The ultimate purpose of the
indemnity payments is to ensure rancher cooperation and
increase the likelihood of successful wolf reintroduction.
Simply compensating them for lost revenue may be
insufficient, since there are costs associated with wolf
predation that are not captured by the model. These costs
include a change in the way cattle are managed in wolf
country, taking the necessary steps to receive a payment
once depredation has occurred, and the risk associated
with replacing a producing cow with an unproven heifer.
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MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
This analysis indicates that ranchers in the BRWRA
were undercompensated for their wolf predation losses.
More broadly, it shows that indemnity payments have
been calculated on a theoretically incorrect approach.
Indemnity payments should be based on how predation
affects a rancher’s revenue: when the depredation
involves a producing cow, the revenue impact often
exceeds the market value of the lost animal because of
disruptions in the production cycle and because many
ranchers prefer to retain one of their heifers rather than
buying a replacement, yet current indemnity payments do
not account for this. Given that rancher cooperation often
is critical to successful reintroduction, it is important that
indemnity payments sufficiently reimburse them for their
losses.
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